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Abstract 
Two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), dominated 
the secondary mortgage market during the US housing crisis, collectively holding or 
guaranteeing $5.3 trillion in mortgage assets by late 2007. As the crisis escalated, the two 
GSEs began to report substantial losses and their survival became uncertain. On September 
6, 2008, the GSEs’ new regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), placed the 
firms into indefinite conservatorships, one step of a four-part government intervention to 
stabilize the enterprises. This case study evaluates the purpose and efficacy of the 
conservatorships and finds that they accomplished their emergency goals of stabilizing the 
GSEs and allowing them to maintain the secondary mortgage market. However, the FHFA 
Office of Inspector General concluded that the agency could better accomplish its oversight 
mission by proactively exerting greater control over its conservator approval process. As of 
this case study’s publication, the conservatorship for both companies is ongoing. 
Keywords: GSEs, conservatorship, secondary mortgage market, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
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At a Glance   
Concurrent with the US housing market’s 
collapse, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac) began to post substantial losses in the 
last two quarters of 2007. These two 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
which were thought to be backed by an 
implicit government guarantee, had 
$5.3 trillion of guaranteed mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) and debt 
outstanding as of December 2007. Given 
their size and importance in the secondary 
mortgage market, the potential insolvency 
of either GSE threatened to destabilize the 
entire housing market and the financial 
system. 
 
Recognizing that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might not be able to stabilize on their own, 
financial officials called for legislation to create a new regulator that could marshal taxpayer 
funds to rescue the GSEs. On July 30, 2008, the government passed the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which created a new GSE regulator, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and provided Treasury with emergency powers to provide 
funding to rescue the GSEs, should they need it. Confronted with further deterioration of the 
two GSEs, the FHFA placed them into indefinite conservatorships on September 6, 2008, as 
part of a four-part rescue plan to stabilize the GSEs. 
 
As conservator, the FHFA immediately suspended dividends on all outstanding stock, 
replaced both GSEs’ CEOs and boards, and then managed the firms indirectly, promising to 
preserve their precrisis business operations as much as possible. The Treasury funded the 
firms in conservatorship pursuant to Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements(SPSPAs), 
ultimately investing a combined $191.5 billion between 2008 and 2017. While both GSEs 
remained solvent and continued to maintain a secondary mortgage market throughout the 
crisis, they reported annual losses until 2012. In February 2012, the FHFA submitted a new 
plan for conservatorship, which focused more on preparing the GSEs and the secondary 
mortgage market for operations after conservatorship. As of this case study’s publication, 
however, no plan to end the conservatorships has progressed beyond the drafting phase.  
 
Summary Evaluation 
Most scholars and evaluators agree that the conservatorships successfully accomplished 
short-term emergency goals because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remained solvent. The 
interventions also allowed the GSEs to continue purchasing loans and issuing and 
guaranteeing MBS to the secondary mortgage market when private-label securitization 
dried up during the crisis. However, the conservatorships have been criticized for poor 
oversight and for at times prioritizing the GSEs’ financial health over the government’s 
broader crisis-fighting goals.   
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To prevent the housing GSEs from 
becoming insolvent and to allow these GSEs to 
continue to maintain the secondary mortgage 
market, supporting US mortgage lending. 
Announcement Date September 7, 2008 
Operational Date September 6, 2008 
Expiration Date  Indefinite/None 
announced 
Return to Profitability FY2012 
Legal Authority HERA §1117 
Funder US Department of the 
Treasury 
Conservator The Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) 
Total Investment $191.5 billion 
The Conservatorships 
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The Conservatorships: United States Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
$14,628.0 billion in 2009 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
$47,100 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year 
senior debt)  





Size of banking system  
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
$9,789.07 billion in total assets in 2009 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP  
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
66.9% in 2009 
Size of banking system assets as a 
percentage of financial system 
assets  
29.0% in 2007 
30.5% in 2008 
30.23% in 2009 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system  
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
19% of total banking assets in 2009 
Government ownership of banking 
system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2008 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2009 











The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are large government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
that are publicly traded and governed but which were chartered by congressional mandate 
and are required to satisfy certain government housing goals (FCIC 2011a, 38–39). Many 
investors believed that the GSEs were backed by an implicit guarantee from the federal 
government (FCIC 2011a, 39). GSE debt and securities were considered safe and were widely 
held by US and non-US financial and governmental entities (FCIC 2011a, 39).  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s primary business was to buy from originators whole 
mortgages that met certain criteria (so-called “conforming” mortgages), which they then 
bundled into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that they guaranteed and sold (FCIC 2011a, 
39). The two GSEs also retained some of these mortgages in their investment portfolios, 
where they also held agency and non-agency MBS, including nonprime securities (subprime 
and Alt-A) that they purchased on the open market (FCIC 2011a, 39; FCIC 2011b, 123). 
Between 1990 and 2003, the percentage of outstanding residential mortgage debt owned or 
guaranteed by the GSEs grew from 25.7% to 46.3% (FHFA 2010a). After 2003, the 
percentage began to decline as nonconforming mortgage origination funded by private-label 
mortgage-backed securities (PLMBS) increased (Lockhart 2009). As shown in Figure 1, 
however, the GSE share began to gradually increase again in 2006 after policy changes at the 
firms reduced underwriting standards, which allowed the GSEs to compete with private 
firms by buying more nonconforming mortgages, which they could not guarantee as MBS but 
which they could hold in their portfolios (FCIC 2011b). 
Figure 1: Percentage of Outstanding Residential Mortgage Debt Held by the GSEs 
 
Source: FHFA n.d.-b. 
 
Beginning in mid-2007, private-label residential securitization began to shrink to minimal 
levels because of the housing correction, increasing the GSEs’ market share of new loans to 




























Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding Fannie Mae Share
Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding Freddie Mac Share
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Their market share exceeded 75% during the first half of 2008; the GSEs continued to 
provide the contracting housing market, which needed liquidity, while also tightening 
standards for risk management during the 2007–08 market downturn (Lockhart 2008). 
As early as mid-2007, the GSEs began to feel the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis as 
default rates on subprime and nonprime mortgages spiked, causing mortgage lending to 
slow, the value of mortgage securities to plummet, and private mortgage securitization to 
evaporate (OFHEO 2008, i–iii). Compounding the effects of the crisis on the firms was their 
high leverage, which left them especially vulnerable to the market correction (FCIC 2011c, 
309). By December 2007, the two companies were highly leveraged—owning or 
guaranteeing $5.3 trillion of mortgages, with capital of less than 2% (FCIC 2011c, 309). Both 
GSEs reported billion-dollar losses for fiscal year 2007, the first ever for Freddie Mac and the 
first in 22 years for Fannie Mae (OFHEO 2008, 10). 
Deteriorating circumstances made it difficult for the two companies to raise capital and to 
meet their safety and soundness standards, especially after the near collapse of Bear Stearns 
in March 2008 due to sudden disruptions in liquidity (FCIC 2011c, 312–18). By the summer 
of 2008, after having become increasingly reliant on short-term funding, both GSEs became 
unable to borrow against their securities to garner enough cash in the repo market (FCIC 
2011c, 316). Market concerns increased on July 7, 2008, when a Lehman Brothers 
investment analyst released a report speculating that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would 
not be able to raise additional capital in light of weak market conditions for their stocks and 
the possible effect of a new accounting standard that would require the firms to bring their 
off-balance-sheet entities onto their balance sheets (Harting 2008). The GSEs’ common share 
prices dropped by more than 16% as a result (Lockhart 2008). 
When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posted billion-dollar losses for fiscal year 2007, the 
market began to recognize that the firms’ weakened condition could destabilize the 
mortgage market and, by extension, the entire financial system (FCIC 2011c, 311–12). 
Government officials escalated efforts to pass legislation that would permit developing a 
viable plan that would support the firms and prevent their collapse (FCIC 2011c). 
On July 13, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) invoked its emergency authority under 
Section 13(13) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize lending through its discount window 
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for a period of 90 days or less (BGFRS 2008). Section 13(13) 
allows the Fed to lend to any private entity using government or government-guaranteed 
debt as collateral.4 In its statement, the Fed said it was concerned about the systemic risks 
that the companies’ difficulties posed, particularly to the functioning of residential mortgage 
markets (BGFRS 2008). The Fed said its authorization was intended to supplement 
Treasury’s authority to lend directly to the GSEs (BGFRS 2008). 
The Fed—in connection with officials from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Treasury—undertook a review of 
the GSEs’ operations, which concluded that both GSEs would soon become insolvent (FCIC 
2011c, 317–18). During this time, Treasury’s advisors from Morgan Stanley also reviewed 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s business operations, and their assessment corroborated the 
Fed and the other government officials’ conclusions (FCIC 2011c, 317). 
 
4 Unlike Federal Reserve Act Section 13(3), which the Fed relied on for many of its crisis programs, Section 
13(13) does not restrict lending to emergency situations. 
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Because of these concerns, and at the behest of financial regulators and Treasury, Congress 
passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA)5 on July 30, 2008 (FCIC 
2011c, 316–17). HERA created a new GSE regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), with enhanced authorities, provided enhanced resolution options and, importantly, 
gave the Treasury emergency authority to buy the securities and obligations of the GSEs 
(FCIC 2011c, 316). Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson hoped that the government’s 
commitment to preserve the GSEs could keep both companies in operation (FCIC 2011c, 
316–17). However, the situation continued to deteriorate (Thompson 2021). 
Program Description 
The FHFA took Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship on September 6, 2008—
the first step of a four-part rescue program designed to stabilize the GSEs and avoid their 
likely collapse (FHFA n.d.-a). Treasury oversaw the other three steps, which were to:  
• Enter into Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (SPSPAs) with each GSE, 
• Establish a new secured credit facility that the GSEs could borrow from, and 
• Commit to purchase GSE mortgage-backed securities (Frame et al. 2015, 15).6  
The FHFA stated that: 
The purpose of appointing the Conservator is to preserve and conserve the 
[Enterprises’] assets and property and to put the [Enterprises] in a sound and solvent 
condition. The goals of the conservatorship are to help restore confidence in [Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac], enhance [their] capacity to fulfill [their] mission, and mitigate 
the systemic risk that has contributed directly to the instability in the current market. 
(FHFA 2008c, 2) 
To this end, the FHFA would later define the “central goal” of the conservatorship7 as 
“minimizing [GSE] credit losses from delinquent mortgages” (DeMarco 2010). The agency 
would also guide its decisions about the conservatorship to be consistent with the statutory 
purpose of the conservator for “reorganizing, rehabilitating, or winding up the affairs of a 
regulated entity” (HERA 2008, §1367). Although the conservatorship did not have an 
expiration date, the FHFA and Treasury asserted that the conservatorship was intended as a 
temporary measure, or, as Secretary Paulson called it, “a time out” (Paulson 2010, 54). 
When the FHFA became conservator, it assumed all power previously vested in the GSEs’ 
directors, officers, and shareholders and shifted the firms’ focus to align with the goals of the 
conservatorships (FHFA-OIG 2015, 6–7). (See Appendix A for an overview of the impact of 
this shift.) As conservator, the FHFA could govern the companies in any legal capacity to 
stabilize them, and its actions were not subject to judicial review (FHFA-OIG 2015, 7). The 
 
5 Public Law 110-289. See Thompson and Kulam (2021) for a detailed discussion of the relevant provisions of 
HERA. 
6 See Thompson (2021) for discussion of the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, Vergara (2021) for 
the GSE Credit Facility, and Zanger-Tishler and Wiggins (2021) for Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program. For 
a discussion of the overall government effort, see Wiggins et al. (2021). 
7 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put into separate conservatorships. We herein refer to the 
conservatorships as one due to the similarities across the two structures. Additionally, while the 
conservatorships are ongoing, our focus is on the crisis period; therefore, we focus on the period through 
FY2012, when the enterprises returned to profitability. 
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FHFA immediately replaced the GSEs’ boards of directors and CEOs, suspended voting rights, 
and froze dividends for common and preferred stockholders (Fannie Mae 2008b, 24). Fannie 
reported in its 2008 10-K that “because we are in conservatorship, we ‘will no longer be 
managed with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns’” (Fannie Mae 2008b, 
24). The GSEs’ stock continued to trade, however (FHFA 2008c, 3). While the FHFA 
suspended the equity shareholders’ rights, it protected rights of senior and subordinated 
debtholders (Fannie Mae 2008b, 24; Frame et al. 2015, 27).  
With Treasury serving as a financial backstop (discussed below), the FHFA also declared that 
the existing GSE capital limits were not binding during the conservatorship and then 
suspended them altogether, although it continued to monitor them (FHFA 2008d, 11). 
Treasury Funding 
Concomitant with the establishment of the conservatorships, each GSE entered into a Senior 
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement with the Treasury, which committed Treasury to 
provide up to $100 billion to each firm in exchange for preferred stock and specified 
warrants, guaranteeing the solvency of each GSE (Thompson 2021, sec. “Program 
Description”). Treasury later raised the funding ceiling to $200 billion per firm, then 
effectively committed an unlimited amount for 2010–12, and reinstated a ceiling on newly 
available funds equal to $200 billion thereafter (Thompson 2021, “Program Description”). 
For several years, the GSEs ran losses and requested draws pursuant to the SPSPAs (FHFA-
OIG 2015, 2–3). In 2012, the SPSPAs were amended to replace the fixed-rate dividend for 
Treasury’s senior preferred stock with a variable dividend, which effectively transferred all 
of the GSEs’ net income to Treasury (Thompson 2021, sec. “Key Design Decision No. 11”). 
From the beginning of the conservatorship through the third quarter of 2019, the firms paid 
a combined $301 billion to Treasury in dividends (FHFA 2019). 
Commitments. Commitments under the SPSPAs that the FHFA had to ensure the firms 
adhered to included informing Treasury of any major decisions regarding, and seeking its 
approval for:  
• Ending the conservatorships, 
• Making certain executive compensation decisions,8 
• Permitting certain transfers or sales of assets (except for fair market value and in the 
ordinary course of business), 
• Declaring dividends, 
• Deciding other matters regarding equity interests, and 
• Allowing mergers and acquisitions (Fannie Mae 2008b, 28–29). 
 
8 In addition to the requirements under the SPSPAs, the FHFA also had to comply with the requirements of 
Section 110 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) that obligated it to develop or adopt 
programs that would minimize foreclosures (DeMarco 2010). 
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Also, pursuant to the SPSPAs, the FHFA capped each GSE’s portfolio at $850 billion and 
required a 10% annual reduction, to begin in 2010 (UST/Fannie Mae 2008, 9). However, 
reduction below $250 billion was not required (UST/Fannie Mae 2008, 9). The FHFA also 
capped each GSE’s debt limit to 110% of its debt held on June 30, 2008, which was 
$859.9 billion for Fannie Mae and $956.5 billion for Freddie Mac (UST/Fannie Mae 2008, 9). 
The FHFA later amended the terms of the SPSPA covenants several times (Thompson 2021, 
sec. “Program Description”). 
Infrastructure of Conservatorships 
To manage the conservatorships, the FHFA established the Office of Conservatorship 
Operations (OCO) (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 20). Consisting of six employees, the OCO served as the 
point of contact between the FHFA and the GSEs and sought to harmonize GSE operations 
with FHFA’s goals: maintain the GSEs’ assets, ensure that the enterprises fulfilled their 
missions, and advance their departure from conservatorship (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 20–21). In 
addition to the director of the FHFA, staff from the OCO attended the GSEs’ board meetings 
and many GSE executive management meetings (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 21). 
Under the terms of the conservatorship, the agency had some latitude as to how it could 
manage the firms and opted for an indirect management style (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 22–24). On 
November 28, 2008, the agency delegated authority to the GSEs’ new boards of directors to 
oversee management, and to the executive management, including the new CEOs, to oversee 
day-to-day operations (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 22). The FHFA retained authority over certain 
significant and unusual business decisions, as shown in Figure 2, for which the GSEs were 
required to request agency approval (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 22–24). Despite the delegation, the 
FHFA also retained authority, at its discretion, to review any delegated decision (FHFA-OIG 
2012a, 22–24).  
Figure 2: GSE: Nondelegated Authorities Requiring Conservator Approval 
1. Actions involving capital stock, dividends, the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, 
increases in risk limits, material changes in accounting policy, and reasonably foreseeable material 
increases in operational risk 
2. Creation of any subsidiary or affiliate or any substantial transaction between the enterprise and any 
of its subsidiaries or affiliates, except for transactions undertaken in the ordinary course of business 
3. Matters that related to conservatorship, such as the initiation and material actions about significant 
litigation addressing the actions or authority of the conservator, repudiation of contracts, qualified 
financial contracts in dispute due to conservatorship status, and counterparties attempting to nullify 
or amend contracts due to conservatorship status 
4. Actions involving hiring, compensation, and termination benefits of directors and officers at the 
executive vice president level and above 
5. Actions involving the retention and termination of external auditors and law firms serving as 
consultants to the enterprises’ respective boards of directors  
6. Settlements in excess of $50 million of litigation, claims, regulatory proceedings, or tax-related 
matters 
7. Any merger with (or purchase or acquisition of) a business involving more than $50 million 
8. Actions that in the reasonable business judgment of the enterprises’ respective boards of directors 
were likely to cause significant reputational risk 
Source: FHFA-OIG 2012b, 6–7. 
 
The FHFA chose its style of conservatorship to achieve efficiency, concordant goals, and 
operational savings (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23–24). The GSEs and their employees knew their 
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businesses and were well equipped to continue to carry out normal business operations 
(FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23). The GSEs’ objectives in conservatorship were the same as the 
government’s objectives (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23). Additionally, creating and staffing an FHFA 
unit large enough to directly oversee the entities’ normal operations would have required 
significant expense (funded by the taxpayers), and then there was a likelihood of overlap 
(FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23–24). Moreover, given that the term of the conservatorships was 
unknown, the efficacy of creating such a unit was questionable (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23–24).  
In July 2009, the FHFA established a Conservatorship Governance Committee (CGC) 
composed of senior FHFA executives whose goal was to “ensure coordination on regulatory 
or supervisory matters that might need to be brought to the attention of the conservator” 
(FHFA-OIG 2012a, 21). The committee met weekly to coordinate issues related to the GSEs’ 
operations and decision-making authorities, and received notifications from the enterprises 
and the OCO about imminent issues (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 20-21; FHFA-OIG 2012b, 10).  
Upon delegation, the FHFA directed the GSEs to implement internal processes for seeking 
conservator approval for the nondelegated authorities (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 19–21). In 2010, 
the FHFA established a formal tracking system to organize the large volume of requests and 
manage their resolutions (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 20–21).  
In December 2011, the OCO sought to clarify the protocol for seeking FHFA approval and 
created a “one-entry” submission process (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 8). Any communications 
conducted outside this process (with limited exceptions) were not considered valid (FHFA-
OIG 2012b, 8). Executive compensation issues and certain legal issues still had to be 
approved by the FHFA’s Offices of Policy and Analysis and its general counsel, respectively 
(FHFA-OIG 2012b, 8). 
FHFA employees who were not part of OCO participated in the conservatorship activities 
through resolving requests for approval and/or providing information to the OCO (FHFA-
OIG 2012b, 9–11). In addition to its rights and duties as conservator, the FHFA continued its 
role as GSE regulator. While the FHFA could request information from Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac as conservator, it continued to gather information and conduct safety and 
soundness measures using its regulatory apparatuses, particularly the Division of Enterprise 
Regulation (DER), a unit charged with fulfilling the agency’s regulatory responsibilities 
toward the GSEs (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 11, 32). 
The relationship between the FHFA’s conservatorship and supervision duties was described 
by the FHFA as follows:  
FHFA’s supervision staff does not participate in corporate decision-making or 
management functions, but maintains a detailed, current understanding of Enterprise 
business operations and risk management and brings a supervisory perspective to 
bear in engaging with the Enterprises and FHFA conservatorship staff. FHFA strives 
to strike a balance so that supervision and conservatorship activities are sufficiently 
separate to ensure supervisory independence, but Division staff coordinates to an 
appropriate degree so that there is the benefit of intra-agency collaboration on 
significant risk matters impacting the Enterprises. (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 32) 
One example of this “intra-agency collaboration” is that the OCO relied on the DER’s 
regulatory review of the GSEs’ finances rather than conducting a separate review (FHFA-OIG 
2012b, 32). 
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On June 20, 2011, the FHFA issued a final rule that clarified its conservatorship and 
receivership authorities (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 21).9 The agency also periodically augmented its 
directions to the GSEs with “Letters of Instruction” (FHFA-OIG 2015, 12–13). 
Despite the FHFA’s efforts to manage the conservatorship, a 2012 FHFA Office of Inspector 
General (FHFA-OIG) audit report concluded that the agency “can better accomplish its 
oversight mission by proactively exerting greater control over its conservator approval 
process” (sec. “At a Glance”). The authors criticized the agency for being passive in its 
oversight and for not ensuring that it reviewed significant matters, that its directives were 
adhered to, or that its processes were followed (FHFA-OIG 2012b, sec. “At a Glance”). For 
example, Freddie Mac did not establish internal procedures for requesting approvals until 
May 2011, and Fannie Mae had not established any such written procedures by 2012 (FHFA-
OIG 2012b, 7–8). As a result, communications were scattered: GSEs filed requests to the 
agency in a decentralized manner, there was no single point of contact at either firm, and the 
GSEs did not apply consistent application criteria when deciding which requests ought to be 
sent to the conservator for approval (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 7–8). FHFA-OIG also found flaws in 
the processes that had been established, such as weak documentation and record-keeping 
practices (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 12–25). FHFA-OIG concluded that the OCO did not have a full 
grasp of the conservatorship issues being addressed by FHFA and recommended 
improvements: 
Specifically, FHFA-OIG recommends that the Agency: (1) revisit FHFA’s non-
delegated authorities to ensure that significant Enterprise business decisions are sent 
to the conservator for approval; (2) guide the Enterprises to establish processes to 
ensure that actions requiring conservator approval are properly submitted for 
consideration; (3) properly analyze, document, and support conservator decisions; 
and (4) confirm compliance by the Enterprises with conservator decisions. (FHFA-
OIG 2012b, sec. “At a Glance”) 
The FHFA agreed with most of the recommendations and acted to adopt them (FHFA-OIG 
2012b, sec. “Appendix A”). In 2013, the conservatorship offices were merged into a newly 
formed Division of Conservatorship, which employed 25 persons compared to the prior six 
(FHFA-OIG 2015, 14).  
Operational Emphasis Shifted during Conservatorships 
Under the conservatorship, the FHFA directed the GSEs to continue their key business 
operations and MBS securitizations (FHFA 2008d, 92). No restrictions were placed on the 
amount of MBS that the GSEs could issue or guarantee (FHFA 2008d, 92). During the early 
phase of the conservatorship, the FHFA focused the GSEs on stemming credit losses and 
reducing their retained portfolios, which many investors thought had become outsized and 
were a source of significant losses (DeMarco 2010, 5). The FHFA also committed to having 
the GSEs fulfill their affordable housing goals throughout the duration of the conservatorship 
(DeMarco 2010, 7). (See Figure 5 for a description of how the FHFA’s strategic objectives 
evolved over time.) 
Some of the steps taken to implement these objectives included the FHFA tightening GSE 
underwriting standards, which raised the average FICO credit score of guaranteed 
mortgages by 35 to 40 points over the following two years (FHFA 2011, iv). The FHFA also 
shifted guarantee fee calculations from loan volume to underlying loan risk and eliminated 
 
9 See 12 C.F.R., Part 1237 (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 21). 
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preferential underwriting standards for certain entities (MBA 2017, 6). Also, the FHFA 
requested that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “become much more aggressive and innovative 
in their approaches to loan modification activities to reduce preventable foreclosures” 
(FHFA 2008d, 14).  
The FHFA’s conservatorship infrastructure evolved in tandem with its theory of operations. 
In February 2012, the FHFA submitted to Congress a new strategic plan for the 
conservatorship, which incorporated policy recommendations circulated by the Obama 
administration and Congress (FHFA 2012a, 4). The political aspirations for the GSEs were to 
build a new infrastructure for the secondary mortgage market and to significantly shrink the 
GSEs’ operations and role in the housing markets (see Figure 3) (FHFA 2012a, 4). Notably, 
the 2012 strategic plan did not carry over the explicit objective regarding fulfilment of the 
affordable housing mission.10 
Figure 3: FHFA Objectives for the Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
2010 2012 2014 
1. Pursue loan modification and 
mitigate credit losses from 
delinquent mortgages 
1. Build a new infrastructure for 
the secondary mortgage market  
1. Maintain, in a safe and sound 
manner, foreclosure prevention 
activities and credit availability 
for new and refinanced 
mortgages to foster liquid, 
efficient, competitive, and 
resilient national housing 
finance markets  
2. Reduce retained portfolios by 
10 percent per year, beginning 
this year from YE2009 
maximum allowed balances of 
$900 billion, per SPSPAs 
2. Contract the GSEs’ dominant 
presence in the marketplace 
while simplifying and shrinking 
their operations  
2. Reduce taxpayer risk through 
increasing the role of private 
capital in the mortgage market 
3. Prohibit new products as 
inconsistent with the purposes 
of the conservatorships 
3. Maintain GSE foreclosure 
prevention activities and credit 
availability for new and 
refinanced mortgages 
3. Build a new single-family 
securitization infrastructure for 
use by the enterprises and 
adaptable for use by other 
participants in the secondary 
market in the future 
4. Ensure fulfillment of the 
affordable housing mission  
 
 
Sources: DeMarco 2010; FHFA 2012a; FHFA 2014. 
Both GSEs reported profits for several quarters during fiscal year 2014. After the close of 
that year, with their future still undecided, the FHFA submitted an updated strategic plan 
that preserved the three key objectives from the 2012 plan (FHFA 2014, 5). The goal of the 
updated plan was “overseeing the conservatorships of the Enterprises in their current state 
 
10 This change presumably reflects the stance adopted by the Obama administration in February 2011, when it 
submitted a report to Congress titled “Reforming America’s Housing Finance Market.” In the report, the  
Administration proposed winding down Fannie and Freddie and giving the affordable housing mission to the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) (UST 2011, 18–22).  
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and ensuring that the Enterprises’ infrastructure meets the needs of their current credit 
guarantee businesses and other operations” (FHFA 2014, 5).  
Outcomes 
Due to the conservatorships and the four-part rescue plan, the GSEs continued to operate 
after conservatorship similarly to how they did before conservatorship because they 
maintained their key role in the secondary mortgage market and successfully prevented its 
collapse (FHFA 2008d, 86–88). As private-label securitization had evaporated, the role of the 
GSEs became even more critical during the months following September 2008, and the 
percentage of new mortgages that they purchased increased (FHFA 2008d, 86–88, 91).  
Immediately following the conservatorship announcement, market demand for GSE debt 
seemed to increase (FOMC 2008, 4). However, given the restrictions on dividends and voting 
rights for common shareholders imposed by the conservatorship, and that the SPSPAs 
established a stock class senior to all existing GSE classes of stock, the common stock of the 
two GSEs—which had already fallen more than 95% since the previous year—continued to 
lose value (FOMC 2008, 4; Thompson 2021, sec. “Key Design Decision No. 4”).  
Mortgage yields also fell for a brief period. The Monday following the announcement of the 
conservatorships, the rates on Fannie Mae’s five-year debt and its mortgage-backed 
securities MBS dropped about 30 basis points and 50 basis points, respectively, relative to 
yields on five-year Treasuries (Frame et al. 2015, 22). In response to the drop in MBS yields, 
conforming mortgage rates fell by 40 basis points (Frame et al. 2015, 22). Following Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse on September 15, mortgage rates rose above pre-conservatorship levels 
(Frame et al. 2015, 22–23).  
On November 25, 2008, hoping to ease yield levels down, the Fed introduced its large-scale 
asset purchases, which enabled the central bank to purchase up to $500 billion in MBS and 
$100 billion of GSE debt (later raised to $1.25 trillion in MBS and $175 billion of GSE debt) 
(CBO 2010, 10). By March 2009, GSE mortgage yields had fallen 150 basis points (Lockhart 
2009).  
One of the GSEs efforts to strengthen their financial positions was to enforce representations 
and warranties made by loan originators, which meant that Fannie and Freddie tried to shift 
credit losses (stemming from defaulted mortgages) to the originators that relied on poor 
documentation and underwriting standards (Frame et al. 2015, 27–28). This practice led 
originators to tighten underwriting standards and increased the cost of mortgage lending, 
which some critics identified as inconsistent with the GSEs’ broader housing objectives 
(Frame et al. 2015, 27–28). However, tightened underwriting standards led to an increase in 
the percentage of mortgages purchased by the GSEs with a loan-to-value ratio of 80% or 
less—from 76% to 89% from 2007 to 2009 (Fannie Mae 2009, 151; Freddie Mac 2009, 151). 
Nevertheless, the GSEs continued to report losses for nearly four years after the 
conservatorship’s implementation, mainly due to continued mortgage defaults (particularly 
in single-family credit guarantees), falling housing prices impacting their securitization 
businesses and portfolios, and the cost of annual dividends on senior preferred stock, which 
the GSEs paid to Treasury (Frame et al. 2015, 25). 
The GSEs have each significantly reduced the sizes of their portfolios and outstanding debt 
since the beginning of conservatorship, as shown below in Figure 4. During this period, they 
also have maintained or slightly increased the amount of their MBS issuances, which 
increased their market share of mortgage securitization after private-label activity began to 
decline in 2007 (OFHEO 2008, 9–17). Additional nonmonetary changes occurring under 
conservatorship are shown below in Figure 5. 
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The fiscal year 2012 marked a turning point for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHFA’s 
conservatorship operations: for the first time since 2008, the GSEs did not require additional 
Treasury funds to cover their losses (FHFA 2012c, 16). Pursuant to the third amendment to 
the SPSPAs, all profits were paid to Treasury (FHFA 2012c, 87). 
In each statement of strategic objectives, the FHFA emphasized that conservatorship was not 
a long-term strategy for the GSEs. Because the firms were chartered by Congress, the agency 
was limited in its options for rehabilitation (Frame et al. 2015, 18–21). The FHFA could only 
release the firms from conservatorship back to their previous structures, which was 
politically contentious, and the potential merits of reprivatization were unclear (Frame et al. 
2015, 18–21). By the time the GSEs began realizing a profit in FY2012, they collectively owed 
the government $189.5 billion (liquidation preference plus initial investment pursuant to 
the SPSPAs) (Thompson 2021, sec. “Outcomes”). Although the GSEs have paid Treasury a 
combined $292.3 billion in dividends (through the fourth quarter 2018), such payments did 
not reduce their debt but did keep them from retaining earnings and building their capital 
(Thompson 2021, sec. “Key Design Decision No. 11”). 
Since the conservatorship began, many individuals and entities, mainly shareholders, have 
sought damages from the FHFA, and several of these cases remain unresolved (Solomon and 
Zaring 2015, 372–78). Several governmental and private parties have proposed plans to end 
the conservatorships and reform the entities, which would require congressional action 
(Solomon and Zaring 2015, 419–26). At this time, however, the GSEs remain in 
conservatorship (Thompson 2021, sec. “Outcomes”). 
Figure 4: GSE Sizes (in billions of USD) 
 Fannie Mae Freddie Mac 
Date Portfolio MBS/Guarantees Debt Portfolio MBS/Guarantees Debt 




2010 $802.9 $2,642.8 $830.2 $710.2 
 
$1,763.7 $742.6 
2012 $654.3 $2,694.8 $664.1 $568.0  $1,591.7  $570.3  
2014 $438.1  $2,768.3 $479.0  $413.6  $1,646.4  $439.5  
2016 $306.5 $2,861.3 $353.6 $308.1 $1,817.9  $381.5  
Note: “Date” reflects GSE size in September of the year listed. 
Sources: Fannie Mae 2008a; Fannie Mae 2010; Fannie Mae 2012; Fannie Mae 2014; Fannie 
Mae 2016; Freddie Mac 2008; Freddie Mac 2010; Freddie Mac 2012; 2014; Freddie Mac 2016. 
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Figure 5: GSE Programs and Operations before and after the Conservatorship 
GSE Reform: Quick View 
 GSEs Pre-Conservatorship GSEs in Conservatorship 
Investor purpose 
 
Growth of stock returns/risks Conservation of assets 
Regulatory limitations on 
pricing 
No Yes 
Retained investment portfolio 
 
Large Reduced 
Capital standards Low capital levels on both 
retained/guaranteed risk 
Reduce capital cushion to zero 
by 2018 
SF risk transfers to private 
market 
Front-end only (MI and lender 
recourse) 
Testing back-end structures in 
addition to front-end 
MF risk transfers to private 
market 
Lender risk share Lender and capital markets risk 
share/transfer 
Number of entities 
 
Two Two 
New guarantor entrants 
permitted 
No No 
SF lender access Preferential pricing and underwriting 
by loan volume 
Guarantee fee and 
underwriting variances 
restricted 
Support for single-family TBA 
market 
Yes Yes 




infrastructures and processes 
Yes Yes 




Terms: SF (single family), MI (mortgage insurance), MF (multifamily), TBA (To be announced). 
Source: MBA 2017, vii. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act passed in July 2008 constituted an 
essential step to establish and finance the conservatorship. 
The government passed HERA in July 2008 to provide enhanced resolution alternatives to 
the GSEs’ regulator in light of the severely weakened condition of the firms, their critical role 
in the stability of the mortgage and housing markets, and the stresses then impacting those 
markets (among other things) (Frame et al. 2015, 14). Prior to HERA, OFHEO (Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, former GSE regulator) could have taken the firms into 
conservatorship, but there existed no viable funding to support such a move, largely 
rendering the authority ineffective (Frame et al. 2015, 5). Also, the GSEs were exempt from 
the US bankruptcy code, and there was no authority for OFHEO to place them in receivership 
(Frame et al. 2015, 18–21). HERA created a new regulator, the FHFA, and provided 
mechanisms for Treasury to fund the firms during an emergency period, ensuring their 
solvency during a conservatorship (Frame et al. 2015, 18–21). HERA also provided the FHFA 
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expanded authority to place the firms into receivership if necessary (Frame et al. 2015, 18–
21). (See Thompson and Kulam (2021) for more information regarding HERA.)  
2. Federal officials placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship instead 
of nationalizing them or placing them into receivership. 
 
W. Scott Frame et al. (2015) dismiss the claim that Treasury could have stabilized the GSEs 
by simply buying their debt or MBS without a formal apparatus (21). Noting the amount of 
capital required to stabilize the GSEs, Frame et al. argue that the Treasury needed a 
mechanism to ensure that it could continuously fund the GSEs in the needed amounts (which 
were unknown at the time, but estimates of which were in the tens of billions) (Frame et al. 
2015, 21). As such, Treasury required a government intervention to establish and operate 
such a mechanism (Frame et al. 2015, 19). Operating with the common understanding that 
the government needed to save the GSEs, Frame et al. identify three options that government 
officials could have taken.  
Nationalization. The first option was nationalization, which Frame et al. (2015) define as 
purchasing and controlling at least an 80% equity stake in each company (21). The 
government considered this option the least favorable because the government would have 
been compelled to assume all liability for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and to consolidate 
their operations onto its balance sheet (Frame et al. 2015, 21).  
However, the definition of the term “nationalization” is fluid, unlike the definitions of 
“conservatorship” and “receivership” (which are discussed later) (Elliott 2009, 7). For the 
purposes of this paper, “nationalization” refers to the government gaining a controlling 
interest in a company (one that might be greater than 50% but less than 80%) such that it is 
empowered to make or influence critical decisions about how the company operates. 
Nationalization can be accomplished in a variety of ways but does not denote application of 
a specific, prescribed administrative process, such as conservatorship or receivership, or the 
FDIC bank resolution process, although such processes may be employed (Elliott 2009, 13–
15).  
In light of this working definition, the government could have nationalized the GSEs by 
making—via Treasury—a substantial financial contribution and gaining via contractual 
agreement (such as a stock purchase agreement, memorandum of understanding, or 
shareholders’ agreement) certain constraints on the GSEs operations (Lockhart 2018, 12). 
(Also see Appendix B.) However, taking control of the GSEs without the benefit of a known 
and predictable framework could have created operational and legal messes (Jester et 
al. 2018, 7). Treasury’s ability to operate the companies would still have been subject to 
management’s compliance with the operative contract and complicated by the need to 
comply with various regulations regarding preservation of the GSE charters (Lockhart 2018, 
12). Treasury Secretary Paulson was of the opinion that such an arrangement would not 
adequately protect the taxpayers and, thus, would not agree to contribute capital to the GSEs 
without their being in a conservatorship or receivership (Jester et al. 2018; Lockhart 2018, 
12). 
Receivership. After the passage of HERA, receivership was a second viable option available 
to the government (Frame et al. 2015, 18). The intent of a receivership is to wind down an 
organization rather than merely stabilize it and have it continue operations (Jester et al. 
2018, 7). Under HERA, invoking a receivership would mean the application of timelines and 
the need for a bridge entity since the GSEs could be dissolved only by an act of Congress 
(Frame et al. 2015, 18–19). Additionally, the FHFA would be compelled to reform the firms 
as they were released from receivership, which would have been required in five years 
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(Frame et al. 2015, 20). However, the structure of the GSEs had been debated for years, and 
Congress had yet to resolve those concerns (Frame et al. 2015, 20). 
Dan Jester served in Paulson’s Treasury during the rescue and, with other Treasury officials, 
questioned the feasibility of setting up the receiverships in time to be effective (Jester et al. 
2018, 7). They doubted the GSEs would acquiesce to such a forceful intervention and worried 
the firms would respond by filing lawsuits and drumming up congressional opposition to it 
(Jester et al. 2018, 7). Secretary Paulson also worried that receiverships might also “spook 
the markets” and might put some debtholders at risk, increasing instability of some banks 
and other financial institutions (Lockhart 2018, 12). Moreover, even if the receiverships 
were put in place, Jester et al. expressed doubt that the FHFA—a new agency with “no 
institutional experience managing a receivership”—was up to the task of overseeing the 
successful implementation of one (Jester et al. 2018, 7). 
Conservatorship. The final option was conservatorship. Although a conservatorship could 
last indefinitely, it was seen as a temporary measure that would allow the government to 
take control of the companies and stabilize them for continued operation, while Congress 
considered how to address the more contentious structural aspects of the GSEs’ special 
status (Frame et al. 2015, 20; Jester et al. 2018, 7). Conservatorship also was seen as an 
option that could be implemented swiftly, which was important given the rising number of 
concerns at other major financial institutions that were debtholders (Frame et al. 2015, 20; 
Jester et al. 2018, 7–8). 
Most importantly, however, conservatorship allowed the GSEs to continue their operations 
and supply the secondary mortgage market, something critically needed as the private 
market severely contracted (Frame et al. 2015, 26–27; Jester et al. 2018, 7). The efficacy of 
this option hinged on the Treasury’s ability to finance the conservatorship, which was made 
possible by HERA (Frame et al. 2015, 19). Frame et al. (2015) note that if the Treasury could 
not have financed the conservatorship, then receivership would have been the best option 
(20). HERA also included a clause that allowed the FHFA to later place the GSEs into 
receivership from conservatorship (Frame et al. 2015, 21). However, James Lockhart, then 
director of the FHFA, stated that this was something that his agency never seriously 
considered (Lockhart 2018, 8–10). See Appendix B for a comparison of the attributes of the 
three possible solutions and see Wiggins et al. (2021) for further discussion of the 
conservatorship decision. 
3. Government officials kept the conservatorship decision secret to prevent the 
agencies from exerting political pressure.  
Secretary Paulson identifies secrecy, speed, and timing as the three aspects in the execution 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s conservatorship that avoided a protracted battle with the 
GSEs, news leaks to the public, and a major market swing (Paulson 2010, chap. 1). After 
keeping the conservatorship discussion (and later the conservatorship decision) a secret for 
several weeks, Paulson, FHFA Director Lockhart, and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke presented 
the option to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s CEOs with no warning (Paulson 2010, chap. 1). 
These officials knew that the CEOs might fight to keep their positions and thus gave them no 
time to publicize the conservatorship or solicit assistance from their political contacts on 
Capitol Hill (Paulson 2010, 75–76). Paulson feared that if either CEO decided to resist the 
conservatorship, they could delay its implementation and instigate panic in the markets 
(Paulson 2010, 75–76). 
Federal officials also met with Fannie Mae’s CEO and executive board first, since they 
anticipated that Fannie Mae’s team would be more resistant to the idea (Paulson 2010, 83–
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84). Federal officials took caution to avoid any press coverage of the event and selected the 
FHFA’s office as the location for their private meetings with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(Paulson 2010, 83–84). They arranged for the first meeting with Fannie Mae to start at 
4:00pm on Friday, September 5 so that the markets would have closed before the meeting 
had finished (Paulson 2010, 83–84). After each meeting, they informed members of the 
House Financial Services Committee and Senate Banking Committee, so that they would not 
be surprised when the news broke to the public (Paulson 2010, 87–93). Lockhart and 
Paulson announced the conservatorships as part of a four-part rescue plan for the GSEs on 
Sunday, giving the public an opportunity to react before markets reopened on Monday 
(Paulson 2010, 95–98). 
4. The FHFA replaced the GSEs’ Boards of Directors and CEOs. 
When the FHFA placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, it also replaced 
the firms’ CEOs and appointed new nonexecutive chairmen of the boards (FHFA 2008b). 
Secretary Paulson expressed the gravity of the intervention to justify firing the GSEs’ CEOs 
(Paulson 2010, 93–94). When asked for his rationale to fire Fannie Mae’s CEO, he replied, “I 
don’t think that you could do something this drastic and not change the CEO” (Paulson 2010, 
93–94). FHFA director Lockhart justified removing the GSE boards with similar logic and 
noted, “Although it is not necessary in a conservatorship, new boards are being formed as a 
matter of good governance” (Lockhart 2008).  
As conservator, the FHFA ascended to all authority of the boards and management but 
eventually delegated some of that authority back to the new board and management while 
retaining a right of review (DeMarco 2010, 3–4). Even under conservatorship, in exercising 
their authority, the GSE officers remained “subject to the legal responsibility to use sound 
and prudent business judgment in their stewardship of their companies” (DeMarco 2010, 3).  
5. The FHFA protected all classes of GSE creditors but not shareholders.  
The FHFA adopted this approach to save money, to increase public confidence in the two 
GSEs, and most importantly, to keep the GSEs operating. After enacting the conservatorship, 
the FHFA froze the GSEs’ dividend payments and shareholder voting rights (except for 
Treasury’s senior preferred stock) (Fannie Mae 2008b, 21). The FHFA estimated that 
freezing dividends would save the GSEs about $2 billion in reserve capital annually (FHFA 
2008b). The GSE stock remains outstanding, but there is no guarantee that it will be restored 
to its full rights when the firms exit the conservatorships (Fannie Mae 2008b, 50; FHFA 
2008c, 3).  
Given Treasury’s funding commitment to guarantee GSE solvency (up to the stated limits), 
the GSE bondholders were protected (Jester et al. 2018, 8–9). Federal officials recognized 
that protecting bondholders was critical to minimize immediate risks to the financial system, 
to protect future investors in debt and MBS, and to quiet any concerns about the 
government’s credibility (Lockhart 2009; Paulson 2010; UST 2008). On the day after Fannie 
and Freddie entered conservatorship, FHFA announced that conservatorship did not change 
the legitimacy of current and future financial contracts (FHFA 2008a; Lockhart 2008). 
Important factors supporting the government’s decision to protect all holders of debt and 
MBS included: (1) the sheer size of the GSEs’ liabilities, (2) the nature of the bondholders, 
and (3) the GSEs’ close alignment with the government (Jester et al. 2018, 8–9; UST 2008).  
GSE debt and obligations benefited from an “implied government guarantee,” which helped 
them enjoy a robust market with their debt being widely held (Frame et al. 2015, 1). Much 
of this debt was held by foreign central banks and foreign and domestic financial institutions 
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that believed that GSEs’ securities were effectively risk-free (UST 2008). Secretary Paulson 
felt that allowing the international debtholders to suffer losses could undermine foreign 
investors’ confidence in the United States’ creditworthiness, which could cause a run on the 
dollar or a Treasury sell-off (CBO 2010, 22; Paulson 2010, 77–78). Also, many domestic 
banks, which were already under stress, held GSE debt due to favorable capital rules (Rice 
and Rose 2016, 7–9). 
The government’s actions, in essence, made the implied guarantee firm, which seems to have 
increased confidence in the GSEs, which Lockhart (2008) and Frame et al. (2015, 22) argue 
is evidenced in falling yields—at least before Lehman Brothers collapsed. (See also Wiggins 
et al. [2021] for further discussion of these points.)  
6. The FHFA established a limited infrastructure to manage the conservatorships. 
To manage the conservatorships, the FHFA established a new infrastructure11 consisting of 
the Office of Conservatorship Operations and the Conservatorship Governance Committee 
(FHFA-OIG 2012a, 20–21). The OCO acted as the liaison and administrator between the GSEs 
and the FHFA, relying on FHFA resources to resolve issues (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 20–21). The 
CGC was composed of senior FHFA executives whose goal was to “ensure coordination on 
regulatory or supervisory matters that might need to be brought to the attention of the 
conservator” (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 21).  
Because the OCO employed only six people, the OCO also relied on the regulatory resources 
throughout the FHFA to evaluate the GSEs’ success in achieving these goals and address 
conservator issues (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 21; FHFA-OIG 2012b, 22–23). One audit report 
highlights the possible tensions that may arise from FHFA’s status as both conservator and 
supervisor: “For example, FHFA could potentially be faced with criticizing its own actions or 
those of its senior officials” (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 30). The Office of Inspector General also noted 
that the conflict was partly addressed by the delegation of most management decisions to 
the enterprises’ boards and managers (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 30). 
The FHFA defended its original structure and claimed that the unknown duration of 
conservatorship prevented the agency from making long-term investments in its own 
infrastructure (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 31–32).  
Nevertheless, the FHFA agreed with most of the OIG recommendations and took steps to 
implement them (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 31–37). As it became more apparent that the GSEs would 
not soon exit the conservatorship, the FHFA refined its strategic plans and evaluation 
mechanisms by developing a reporting scorecard; establishing an approval tracking and 
resolution process; and in 2013, consolidating all conservator functions into a Division of 
Conservatorship, which employed 25 people as compared to the previous six-person OCO 
(FHFA-OIG 2012b, 9–11; FHFA-OIG 2015, 11, 14).  
7. The FHFA managed the conservatorship indirectly, delegating significant 
authority to the new boards of directors and CEOs. 
The FHFA’s inspector general (IG) noted that a conservator generally can take one of three 
approaches: “Actively managing every aspect of an entity’s operations; Monitoring the 
conserved entities’ decision-making and stepping in when it feels it is appropriate; or 
 
11 The FHFA described efforts to enhance its governance practices through various white papers and annual 
reports (FHFA-OIG 2015, 13). 
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deferring to the conserved entity on most decisions and stepping in only in cases of greater 
significance” (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 22). The IG noted that FHFA had taken the third approach.  
FHFA has determined to (1) delegate authority for general corporate governance and 
day-to-day matters to the Enterprises’ boards of directors and executive 
management, and (2) retain authority for certain significant decisions. (FHFA-OIG 
2015, 11–12)  
Within three months of establishing the conservatorships, the FHFA had delegated 
significant authority to the new boards of directors and CEOs (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 22, 30). It 
did this as an efficient way to run the massive businesses consistent with the tenets of the 
conservatorship—to manage the firms as going concerns, stabilize them financially, and 
return them to independent operation (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23). However, it’s important to 
note that the FHFA retained authority over a group of key business decisions, for which it 
required the GSEs to seek prior approval (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 19–20). These powers were 
referred to as nondelegated authorities (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 6). Among other things, these 
included capital actions, compensation policies, and other large transactions, including legal 
settlements, merger activities, and deals with subsidiaries (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 19–20). (See 
Figure 2 for a summary of the nondelegated authorities.) In addition to specified 
nondelegated authorities, the FHFA retained the right to review (and to overturn) any other 
business decision it deemed important along the way (DeMarco 2010, 3–4). 
The FHFA cited three reasons in defense of its style of conservatorship: efficiency, 
concordant goals, and operational savings (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23–24). The GSE employees 
knew the business and were well equipped to continue to carry out normal business 
operations (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23). The goals of the enterprises were consistent with those of 
the conservatorships, i.e., return the firms to stability: “FHFA views part of its ‘preserve and 
conserve’ mandate to include preserving the entities as private companies with the capacity 
and responsibility to make business decisions following normal corporate governance 
procedures” (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 31). Acting Director Edward J. DeMarco suggested that 
delegating authority to GSEs created operational savings because FHFA avoided duplicating 
work that the GSEs were already doing (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 23–24). 
Instead, the FHFA communicated with the GSE employees about the conservatorship and 
tried to maximize retention (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 13). The OCO and the CGC worked to ensure 
that the firms were operating in a manner consistent with their delegations of authority, the 
stated conservator goals, and the overall objectives of the conservatorship (FHFA-OIG 
2012a, 20–21). 
However, the OIG found that the agency’s practices were flawed: 
FHFA-OIG’s reports consistently have revealed two trends: (1) the Agency, in its role 
as a conservator, does not independently test and validate Enterprise decision-
making; and (2) the Agency, in its role as a regulator, is not proactive in its oversight 
and enforcement. In addition, FHFA may not have enough examiners to meet its 
oversight responsibilities. (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 2) 
As a result of these procedures, the OIG criticized FHFA for not overseeing several major 
decisions that the GSEs made (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 12–13). These included changes to Fannie’s 
single-family underwriting standards and the High Touch Servicing Program, whereby 
Fannie Mae transferred $1.5 billion in mortgage servicing rights to third-party specialty 
servicers (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 12–13). The inspector general also found that the agency often 
failed to question decisions that were submitted to it for approval and relied too often on 
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management’s decision without an independent proof or business case (FHFA-OIG 2012b, 
20–22).  
Additionally, the OIG concluded that the agency could better accomplish its oversight 
mission by proactively exerting greater control over its conservator approval process: 
Specifically, FHFA-OIG recommends that the Agency: (1) revisit FHFA’s non-
delegated authorities to ensure that significant Enterprise business decisions are sent 
to the conservator for approval; (2) guide the Enterprises to establish processes to 
ensure that actions requiring conservator approval are properly submitted for 
consideration; (3) properly analyze, document, and support conservator decisions; 
and (4) confirm compliance by the Enterprises with conservator decisions. FHFA 
agreed with most of FHFA-OIG’s recommendations.” (FHFA-OIG 2012b, sec. “At a 
Glance”)  
8. The FHFA directed the GSEs to continue fulfilling their statutory purposes, 
including their support for affordable housing. 
The GSE intervention was designed to keep the firms in operation so that they could 
“continue to fulfill their mission of providing stability, liquidity, and affordability to the 
[mortgage] market” (FHFA 2009a, ii). As a result, under the conservatorship, the FHFA 
directed the GSEs to continue their key business operations and MBS securitizations and 
placed no restrictions on the amount of MBS they could issue or guarantee (FHFA 2008d, 
92). Under the SPSPAs, they also were allowed to expand their portfolios for a short time—
up to a limit of $850 billion—before having to start reducing them in 2010 (UST/Fannie Mae 
2008, 9). The GSEs’ ability to continue operations was especially critical early in the 
conservatorship; when private-label securitization shrank during the global credit crisis, the 
GSEs assumed a still larger role in the housing market and purchased a greater proportion 
of new mortgages (OFHEO 2008, 9–17). 
The GSEs’ housing mission was also targeted to assist with the government’s wider 
foreclosure prevention efforts. At the end of 2008, FHFA reported the GSEs were “playing an 
important role in assisting the federal government in foreclosure mitigation activities” 
(FHFA 2009a, 4). Less than one year after the conservatorship began, the GSEs started to 
participate in the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) and Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) (FHFA 2010b, 7–8). HARP and HAMP were intended to serve 
the dual goals of limiting GSE credit losses and alleviating wider mortgage market stress, 
both of which were important for the GSEs’ long-term stability (DeMarco 2010, 5; FHFA 
2009a, 85–87; FHFA 2010b, 7–8). 
During the mortgage crisis, the government continued to prioritize affordable housing goals 
and relied on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks to meet them (CBO 
2010, vii; Lockhart 2009). Through HERA, FHFA received the authority to enforce these goals 
(which had previously rested with the US Department of Housing and Urban Development) 
but mandated a change in the way they were structured beginning in 2010 (FHFA 2010b, 3–
4). Within the first year of the conservatorship, the FHFA adjusted its affordable housing 
goals to account for prevailing market conditions (Lockhart 2009). By the end of 2010, a new 
structure was in place, and the GSEs were required to meet four core single-family goals, one 
multifamily “special affordable” goal, and two related subgoals, on an annual basis (FHFA 
2011, 97). 
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9. The FHFA revised the GSEs’ executive compensation policies while the 
conservatorship created challenges for employee retention and hiring. 
Through HERA, the FHFA had the power to review any decision affecting executive 
compensation and could amend GSE compensation practices as it saw fit12 (FHFA 2009a, 84). 
During the conservatorship, acting FHFA Acting Director DeMarco (who replaced Lockhart 
in September 2009) identified enabling the GSEs to retain and recruit talented executives as 
key to fulfilling his agency’s mission as conservator (DeMarco 2011). Without competent 
executives, the two firms were at high risk of running into trouble yet again—an operational 
risk that could result in more losses and potentially add billions of dollars to the steep price 
taxpayers already had paid (DeMarco 2011). 
Early in the conservatorship, the GSEs endured “key person risk” to their human resources 
(FHFA 2010b, 17–18, 41). FHFA officials argued that potential downsizing, possible 
dechartering, and general public scrutiny could have motivated executives to leave (FHFA 
2010b, 17–18, 41). To offset its key person risk, the FHFA set out to adjust executive 
compensation policies to give talented executives more of an incentive to stay (FHFA 2010b, 
17–18, 41). 
After consulting with Treasury (including the Special Master for TARP Executive 
Compensation) and the boards of both firms, and retaining a private consulting firm (Hays 
Group) to serve as advisor, the FHFA instituted a three-pronged executive compensation 
policy at both firms (DeMarco 2011). FHFA designed the new system to both motivate high-
performing executives to stay and curb the GSEs’ pre-conservatorship excesses (DeMarco 
2011). For example: FHFA prohibited the golden parachutes that were formerly promised to 
outgoing CEOs and other senior executives (DeMarco 2011). Although prior executive 
compensation policies included company stock, FHFA pivoted to a cash-only compensation 
scheme because regulators sought to prevent executives from taking excess risks to raise the 
low prices of their company shares (DeMarco 2011). 
The new system provided for three components of executive compensation—(1) base salary, 
(2) deferred salary, and (3) performance-based incentives—and was modeled after policies 
put in place at “institutions receiving exceptional TARP assistance” (DeMarco 2011). 
Important aspects of these components are highlighted below: 
• Except for a few top executives, maximum base salaries was set at $500,00—less than 
half of what they were prior to conservatorship. 
• Performance-based compensation was determined using only two years of results 
given the lack of a clear long-term plan for the firms. 
• Deferred salary was paid out a year after the base portion and was to be forfeited by 
officials choosing to leave before the year’s deferred payments were due. 
 
12 These broad authorities over executive compensation were granted as part of the arrangement enabling 
Treasury to purchase GSE obligations. Like Treasury’s purchasing authority, these powers were temporary and 
set to expire December 31, 2009. However, on a permanent basis, HERA gave the FHFA other powers over 
executive compensation, including the authority to withhold executive compensation and prohibit severance 
payments. For more information, see Sections 1113, 1114, and 1117 of HERA (Public Law 110-289). 
302




• Deferred payments made up the largest portion of top executives’ total compensation 
packages. (DeMarco 2011) 
In March 2011, the FHFA-OIG published a report analyzing the executive compensation 
policies put in place at both entities and criticized the FHFA for its lack of formal enforcement 
of the new policies (FHFA-OIG 2011, sec. “At a Glance”). The report advised the FHFA to: (1) 
make information on GSE executive compensation more accessible to the public (and “more 
user-friendly”) and (2) develop formal control mechanisms to better enforce the entities’ 
compliance with the new policies (FHFA-OIG 2011, 20–22). 
FHFA balanced the need to attract and retain qualified leadership with mandatory 
restrictions on executive compensation, which was a challenge for both the firms and their 
conservator. In 2019, audits by the FHFA-OIG found that FHFA’s approval of senior executive 
succession planning at both firms had “acted to circumvent the congressionally mandated 
cap on CEO compensation” (FHFA-OIG 2019a, 1–4; FHFA-OIG 2019b, 1–5).13 The firms 
disagreed with the auditor’s conclusions (FHFA-OIG 2019a, 1–4; FHFA-OIG 2019b, 1–5). 
10.  After enacting the conservatorship, the FHFA maintained transparency. 
The FHFA has used plans, reports, and scorecards to disseminate information and increase 
public transparency regarding the conservatorships. On December 15, 2008, the FHFA 
released its first annual performance plan, for fiscal year 2009. The plan outlined the FHFA’s 
objectives for the GSEs and detailed how it would use its resources to achieve those 
objectives (FHFA 2008e). Beginning in 2010, the FHFA also released a quarterly 
Conservator’s Report on the Enterprises’ Financial Performance, which summarized the 
fiscal health of both enterprises under conservatorship; the report lasted through the first 
quarter of 2013 (FHFA 2013). In 2012, the FHFA began to release an annual scorecard, which 
was designed to make the FHFA’s duties and objectives more transparent for the public 
(FHFA 2012b; FHFA 2021). The FHFA also continued the practice of publishing the GSEs’ 
annual examination results within the annual reports to Congress. 
Through its regular reports, the FHFA identified at least two reasons for governing the GSEs 
transparently: (1) to increase public confidence in the GSEs and foster secondary mortgage 
market activity, and (2) to inform taxpayers FHFA’s efforts to prevent foreclosure (FHFA 
2008d, 137–46; FHFA 2009b, 61–62). In addition, DeMarco, who replaced Lockhart in 2009 
as FHFA acting director, acknowledged that taxpayer funds kept Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in operation (DeMarco 2010, 3). For this reason, DeMarco pledged to outline how the 
FHFA had limited, and would continue to limit, GSE losses (DeMarco 2010). Additionally, as 
the GSEs by their size were systemic in nature, many investors around the world were paying 
attention to developments with respect to the conservatorships (Paulson 2010, 77–78). 
III. Evaluation 
W. Scott Frame et al. (2015) argue that the conservatorships succeeded as emergency 
interventions successfully stabilizing the GSEs (30). First, the intervention prevented agency 
debtholders and MBS holders from experiencing losses at a time when such institutions were 
already being challenged to navigate the worsening crisis, shielding the vast number of 
counterparties from negative impacts and containing the GSEs’ weaknesses from bringing 
 
13 See FHFA-OIG 2019a for the latest report on Fannie Mae and FHFA-OIG 2019b for the latest report on Freddie 
Mac. 
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down the entire financial system (Frame et al. 2015, 26–27). In addition, a 2010 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report claimed that, in general, replacing an implicit 
government guarantee with an explicit guarantee, as was done in the intervention, was likely 
to improve the liquidity of the GSEs’ MBS by ensuring a more robust market by attracting a 
broader and more stable group of investors (CBO 2010, 17). However, the report also 
cautions that other countervailing factors must also be considered to gauge the true effect 
(CBO 2010, 17). 
Second, the program allowed the GSEs to continue purchasing loans and issuing and 
guaranteeing MBS, which maintained the flow of funding and helped to stabilize the 
mortgage market (Frame et al. 2015).  
Frame et al. (2015) note that the FHFA’s focus on the financial health of the GSEs may have 
limited the overall mortgage supply; as the FHFA urged Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
return defaulted mortgages to their originators or sellers, originators tightened 
underwriting standards (27–28). While stringent underwriting standards helped to reduce 
the GSEs’ losses, they also shrank the supply of mortgage credit, which, Frame et al. (2015) 
argue, contributed to the market’s slow recovery (27–28). In contrast, the Mortgage Bankers 
Association (MBA) contends that the FHFA’s decision to abolish preferential underwriting 
standards facilitated small lenders’ higher postcrisis market share of mortgage origination 
and refinancing (MBA 2017, 6). In addition, Winston Sale argues that the FHFA cut the GSEs’ 
affordable housing goals to stabilize the market during the crisis (Sale 2009, 300–07). 
Some scholars find that FHFA actions have weakened other sectors of the economy. Tara 
Rice and Johnathan Rose contend that the conservatorship weakened the balance sheets of 
banks exposed to GSE preferred shares (2016, 86). They argue that the FHFA’s decision to 
suspend dividends on preferred shareholders harmed already struggling banks, particularly 
community banks, which held large quantities of GSE stock (Rice and Rose 2016, 86). Fifteen 
banks closed because of this decision, the authors suggest, and two more were forced to sell 
themselves (Rice and Rose 2016, 86).  
From a governance and operational standpoint, several audits by the FHFA’s Office of 
Inspector General found that the FHFA “can better accomplish its oversight mission by 
proactively exerting greater control over its conservator approval process” (FHFA-OIG 
2012b, sec. “At a Glance”). OIG also found that FHFA did not properly monitor several 
components of GSE operations, which resulted in both companies taking inappropriate 
financial risks (FHFA-OIG 2012b, sec. “At a Glance”). For example, a 2015 audit noted that 
the FHFA lacked a formal review process for the GSEs’ compensatory fee settlements and 
large mortgaging service transfers (FHFA-OIG 2015, 15–16). The OIG also found that the 
FHFA did not have an apparatus to measure properly the GSEs’ performance levels or a 
system to monitor all company operations (FHFA-OIG 2015, 15–16). In 2014, for instance, 
the FHFA did not detect that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had over-reimbursed their lender-
based insurance servicers by approximately $159 million ($89 million for Fannie Mae and 
$70 million for Freddie Mac) (FHFA-OIG 2015, 16).  
Other factors cited by the OIG and the FHFA that have impacted the efficacy of the 
conservatorship: 
• The unique size of the GSEs, which were factors larger than any other entity to have 
been previously resolved by the government; 
• The unique nature of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as GSEs, which presented 
operational challenges and limited the conservator’s exit strategies; 
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• The fact that the FHFA was a newly established agency, which at the time of the 
conservatorship was forming itself; 
• Significant turnover of GSE personnel, particularly at the management levels, despite 
retention efforts; and 
• Tensions between the FHFA’s role as regulator and conservator. (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 
26–33) 
Scholars generally find that the conservatorship has been unsatisfactory with respect to the 
longer-term objective of resolving the GSEs’ structural issues and removing the enterprises 
from conservatorship (Frame et al. 2015, 27–30). Despite the government’s intention to use 
the conservatorship temporarily, they remain in effect more than 12 years later.  
While the GSEs continue to operate under conservatorship, Congress has yet to resolve the 
longer-term questions of how to terminate the conservatorships or what would be a new 
form for the entities (Frame et al. 2015, 30). The FHFA cannot discharge the GSEs from 
conservatorship without Treasury’s approval, and all parties seem to agree that releasing 
the GSEs from the conservatorship in their current form, with their quasi-public/private 
hybridity and implicit government guarantee intact, would not be ideal (FHFA-OIG 2012a, 
31–32). It is unlikely that the conservatorships will end until Congress agrees on what form 
the entities should have upon release from the FHFA’s control (FHFA-OIG 2015, 6). 
Despite these views, Jester et al. are of the opinion that enacting the conservatorships 
without developing a plan to exit them was entirely appropriate at the time, as the Treasury 
was focused on stemming the crisis rather than solving the broader policy issues that had 
helped to instigate the GSEs’ demise (Jester et al. 2018, 16–17).  
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Dickinson to James Lockhart that includes reasons for conservatorship and the background of 
the case.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3373. 
Christopher Dickerson to Daniel Mudd (09/04/2008) – Midyear report that classifies Fannie 
Mae as critically undercapitalized, which would give FHFA Director Lockhart discretion to take 
Fannie Mae into receivership (see Key Design Decision No. 2 for more information).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fhfa-dickerson-ltr-fannie-mae-mudd-mid-year-letter. 
Christopher Dickerson to Richard Syron (09/04/2008) – Midyear report that classifies 
Freddie Mac as critically undercapitalized, which would give FHFA Director Lockhart 
discretion to take Freddie Mac into receivership (see Key Design Decision No. 2 for more 
information).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fhfa-dickerson-ltr-freddie-mac-syron-mid-year-letter. 
Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on Conservatorship (09/07/2008) – Defines conservator, 
its function, goals, and other generally asked questions.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fact-sheet-questions-and-answers-conservatorship. 
Implementation Documents 
Conservatorship Strategic Plan 2012 – Focuses on shrinking the GSEs’ role in the mortgage 
market while continuing to provide an adequate supply to the market.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/strategic-plan-enterprise-conservatorships-next-
chapter-story-needs-ending. 
Conservatorship Strategic Plan 2014 – Focuses less attention on reducing the size of Fannie 
and Freddie’s market share.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/2014-strategic-plan-conservatorships-fannie-mae-and-
freddie-mac. 
Letter: Edward DeMarco to Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and 
Committee on Financial Services (DeMarco 2010) – Outlines the FHFA’s commitment to scale 
back the GSEs’ portfolios and establish a new process for product review.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3433. 
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Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (§1424) – Mandates that the FHFA act to 
prevent foreclosures.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3365. 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA 2008, §1117) – Legally authorizes the 
FHFA to take Fannie and Freddie into a conservatorship.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/housing-and-economic-recovery-act-2008. 
Press Releases/Announcements 
Meeting the Challenges of the Financial Crisis (Lockhart 2009) – Outlines actions taken by the 
FHFA, Treasury, and the Fed in the first six months of conservatorship.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/meeting-challenges-financial-crisis 
Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance 
Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (UST 2008) – Treasury press 
release that announces the four-part rescue plan for the GSEs, including the conservatorship.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statement-secretary-henry-m-paulson-jr-treasury-and-
federal-housing-finance-agency-action-0. 
Statement of FHFA Regarding Contracts of Enterprises in Conservatorship (FHFA 2008a) – 
Asserts that both GSEs will honor existing contracts and are able to enter new contracts.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statement-fhfa-regarding-contracts-enterprises-
conservatorship. 
The Appointment of FHFA as Conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Lockhart 2008) 
– Outlines the weaknesses of OFHEO (former GSE regulator) and explains why the FHFA decided 
to enter Fannie and Freddie into a conservatorship.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3405. 
Media Stories 
As Crisis Grew, a Few Options Shrank to One (09/07/2008) – Generally represents the media 
reaction and level of public understanding just after the conservatorship was enacted.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/crisis-grew-few-options-shrank-one. 
In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes over Mortgage Finance Titans (Stephen Labaton 
and Edmund L. Andrews, 09/08/2008) – Generally represents the media reaction and level of 
public understanding just after the conservatorship was enacted.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/rescue-stabilize-lending-us-takes-over-mortgage-
finance-titans. 
Key Academic Papers 
After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath (Solomon and Zaring 
2015) – Explains the legal ramifications of the conservatorship, with particular emphasis on 
the 2012 amendment.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3364. 
Effect of the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on Affordable Housing (Sale 
2009) – Explains how the conservatorship affected the GSEs’ affordable housing goals.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3420. 
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The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Frame et al. 2015) –Addresses the causes of the 
conservatorship and evaluates the program’s efficacy in the short run and the long run.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3415. 
When Good Investments Go Bad: The Contraction in Community Bank Lending after the 
2008 GSE Takeover (Rice and Rose 2016) – Examines and evaluates the effects the 
conservatorship, mainly from the perspective of banks.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3419. 
Reports/Assessments 
2008 Annual Report to Congress (OFHEO 2008) – Covers basic operations, market 
contractions, financial health of the GSEs, and risk. See subsequent years’ reports below.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/ofheo-2008-ofheo-report-congress. 
2008, Revised (FHFA 2009a).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/report-congress-2008-revised. 
2009 (FHFA 2010b).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fhfa-2009-report-congress. 
2010 (FHFA 2011).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fhfa-report-congress-2010. 
2011 (FHFA 06/13/2012).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3390. 
2012 (FHFA 06/13/2013).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3391. 
2013 (FHFA 06/13/2014).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3392. 
2014 (FHFA 06/15/2015).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3393. 
2015 (FHFA 06/15/2016).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3394. 
2016 (FHFA 06/15/2017).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3395. 
2008 Performance and Accountability Report (FHFA 2008d) – Describes factors leading up 
to conservatorship, operations of the FHFA, goals of the FHFA, and management strategies. See 
subsequent years’ reports below.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3375. 
2009 (FHFA 2009b).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3376. 
2010 (FHFA 11/15/2010).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3377. 
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2011 (FHFA 11/14/2011).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3378. 
2012 (FHFA 2012c).   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3379. 
2013 (FHFA 12/16/2013).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3379. 
2014 (FHFA 11/17/2014).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3381. 
2015 (FHFA 11/16/2015).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3382. 
2016 (FHFA 11/15/2016).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3383. 
2012 Conservatorship Scorecard (FHFA 2012b) – Establishes objectives and schedules to meet 
the goals outlined in the FHFA’s strategic plans. See subsequent years’ scorecards below.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3396. 
2013 (FHFA 03/04/2013).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/conservatorship-strategic-plan-performance-goals-
2013. 
2014 Scorecard for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Common Securitization Solutions (FHFA 
05/13/2014). 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3398. 
2015 (FHFA 01/14/2015).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3399. 
2016 (FHFA 12/17/2015).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3400. 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Role in the Secondary Mortgage Market (CBO 
2010) – Analyzes reasons for federal involvement in the secondary mortgage market and 
provides alternative approaches for the future of the secondary mortgage market.   
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3363. 
GSE Reform: Creating a Sustainable, More Vibrant Secondary Mortgage Market (MBA 2017) 
– Develops a new GSE structure that could be sustainable for the GSEs after the conservatorship. 
  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4371. 
Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook [sic] (Urban Institute 01/2016) – Includes 
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Appendix A: Changes to Company Focus under Conservatorship 
 
 
Source: Fannie Mae 2008b. 
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Appendix B: Rescue Options (after the Passage of HERA) 
 Nationalization Receivership Conservatorship 
Legal authority HERA  HERA HERA 
Overseer Secretary of 
Treasury 
FHFA directorˡ FHFA directorˡ 
Agency  Treasury  FHFA FHFA 
Discretionary 
appointment 
Yes Yes² Yes² 
Mandatory 
enactment 
No Yesᵌ  
(1) GSE could not pay back 
debt (60 calendar days; 30 
days if classified as 
“critically 
undercapitalized”) 
(2) GSE assets were less 
than outstanding debt 
No 
Rights Negotiated right to 
appoint directors 
and approve certain 
aspects of company 
as negotiated in 
contract providing 
for equity injection 
or liquidity 
assistance 
All company operations; 
subpoena rights 





limits on payment of 
dividends, mergers, 
acquisitions, sale of 








All powers of 
shareholders, officers, and 
directors with respect to 
the GSE and its assets 
All powers of 
shareholders, officers, 
and directors with 
respect to the GSE and its 
assets 





Maintain the GSEs’ 
solvency and preserve 
their assets and property 
Receivership option Possible N/A Yes 
Liquidation option No Yes No 









ˡ In consultation with the chairman of the Federal Reserve. 
² FHFA director could take either GSE into conservatorship or receivership for any of the 
following reasons: (a) Assets were less than its obligations; (b) substantial dissipation of 
assets; (c) unsafe or unsound condition; (d) cease and desist orders; (e) concealment or 
refusal to provide the books, papers, etc.; (f) inability to pay obligations or meet the demands 
of creditors; (g) losses that would deplete capital, with little chance of recapitalization; (h) 
any legal violations; (i) by request of its board of directors or shareholders; (j) 
undercapitalization; (k) critical undercapitalization; and/or (l) money laundering. 
ᵌ At the discretion of the FHFA director. 
4 In order to restructure the GSEs into new entities, the FHFA and Treasury required 
congressional approval to revoke the GSEs’ charters. Until that point, the charter would 
remain in the bridge entity.  
Compiled by Daniel Thompson. 
Sources for receivership and conservatorship: HERA 2008, Frame et al. 2015. 
Sources for nationalization: Elliott 2009, Frame et al. 2015. 
 
Rights and claims of 
stockholders and 
creditors to GSE 
assets 





except for those related to 
payment, which falls to the 
FHFA director’s discretion 
At discretion of FHFA 
director 
Option of parties to 
net, terminate, or 
liquidate assets  
Possible Yes (after 5pm the 
following day) 
No 
GSE assets and 
liabilities 
Remain on GSE 
balance sheet if 
Treasury control is 
<80%. If Treasury 





GSE charters, assets in 
danger of default, and 
liabilities in danger of 
default would be 
transferred to a limited-
life entity  










Effects funding unless 
keepwell-type funding 
agreement 
Effects funding unless 
keepwell-type funding 
agreement 
Termination At discretion of US 
Treasury but 
subject to 
application of FHFA 
time periods 
(1) Liquidation 
(2) Two years after the 
creation of the bridge 
entity (could be extended 
three more years)  
(1) Receivership  
(2) At discretion of FHFA 
and Treasury 
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